You reach the English Channel, slicing their lines of communications to ribbons, and cutting them off from supply. You smash them, and the next thing you know, your Panzers are cutting clear across the rear of the Allied armies fighting north in Belgium. As a result, your southern drive through the Ardennes encounters only reserve formations, second line troops, and old men. The enemy won’t be expecting this, because the Ardennes is impassable to tanks and supposedly “impregnable.” He swallows your feint whole, rushing north to meet it with his entire strength. How do you defeat a hostile coalition that outnumbers you? Maybe you launch a feint into central Belgium by Army Group B, while your main thrust (Army Group A) actually sends all of your Panzers through the forbidding and densely forested terrain of the Ardennes. Fall Gelb, they called it: “Case Yellow.” I’ve spent a lifetime talking, teaching, and writing about it, and I will never tire of it. We all know that war is horrible, and we all like to think that a perfect plan can bring things to a conclusion before the fighting becomes too unpleasant or bloody.Įxhibit A in this civilized view of warfare is the German operational plan for the invasion of France and the Low Countries in 1940.
A good plan, we argue, can overwhelm the enemy, leading to quick victory and avoiding high casualties. They like to talk about “perfect plans,” showing how the genius of the great commander can manifest itself even before the shooting starts. Military historians love to emphasize the planning process.
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